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ABSTRACT 
As long duration exploration missions (LDEMs) become the norm for spaceflight, 
it is important to understand the factors that may influence how astronaut crews and ground 
control teams work together.  Although there are numerous efforts underway to continue 
to push boundaries in space exploration, much of the existing work to examine teamwork 
is designed to primarily address intrateam issues, not considering how inter-team factors 
may predict team and mission performance. Given the potential future challenges and 
uncertainties of LDEMs, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 
identified a need for risk-mitigating spaceflight multiteam system (SFMTS) interventions 
designed to resolve or prevent inadequate cooperation, coordination, communication, and 
psychosocial adaptation, both within and between component teams. This study serves to 
begin to break apart the specifics of how shifting inter-team autonomy is exhibited within 
teams (i.e., crew claiming, mission control granting) in space and what team boundary 
work (i.e., buffering) looks like in SFMTSs. Regarding inter-team autonomy shifts, we saw 
that the majority (65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded exhibited this shift. Further, 
most of these autonomy shifts were triggered by the space crew claiming its autonomy 
from Mission Control. Almost half (46%) of the critical incidents exhibited an inter-team 
autonomy shift triggered by “crew claiming”. Additionally, our findings focused around 
team boundary work showed that multiple types of team boundary work were often 
exhibited per critical incident.  Buffering and Reinforcement were identified as the top 
team boundary work types, followed closely by Reinforcement and Spanning. The results 
show that very rarely is only one type of team-boundary work shown when there is an inter-
 iii 
team autonomy shift. The current team boundary work patterns found indicate the types of 
functional boundary work needed for inter-team autonomy shifts in complex spaceflight 
multiteam systems. These patterns were derived using the critical incident method and are 
descriptive of behaviors that could be used as the basis of team boundary and inter-team 
autonomy shift training for SFMTSs in LDEM. Implications of the findings from this study 
and future directions are further discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) prepares for Return to 
the Moon 2024 (Gohd, 2019) and subsequent long duration exploration missions (LDEMs), 
efforts will be heavily implemented via spaceflight multiteam systems (SFMTSs), made 
up of multiple, interdependent component teams working towards mission success while 
physically apart from one another (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). To further clarify, 
multiteam systems (MTS) have been described as “two or more teams that interface 
directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the 
accomplishment of collective goals” (Mathieu et al., 2001, p. 290). Multiteam contexts are 
tasks that require a higher level of analysis than the individual and team, but a level lower 
than the organization and possibly extending across boundaries of multiple organizations 
(Mathieu et al., 2001). Tasks performed by MTSs create uniquely challenging situations as 
they often require coordination of efforts from multiple component teams that are often 
previously unacquainted. Further, MTSs often require a collective effort bringing together 
multiple areas of expertise found in the individual teams to tackle challenges in new, 
unconventional ways (Lanaj, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Barnes, & Harmon, 2013; Marks & 
Luvison, 2012). 
The efforts of SFMTSs, when properly coordinated, can achieve unprecedented 
advances in spaceflight, yet they are at an incredible risk for major collaboration 
breakdowns (Vessey, 2014, p. 135-153). Significant challenges relevant for team risk 
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include social isolation, physical confinement, communication delays between crew and 
ground, as well as a long duration, and a high consequence environment. Each of these 
conditions affect the coordination, cooperation and overall performance of the team. Teams 
in space are isolated from Earth, and sometimes may also experience some limited 
psychological isolation (Landon, Vessey, & Barrett, 2016). However,  real-time 
communication technologies (e.g., communication loops with Mission Control Center 
(MCC), Internet Protocol (IP) phone) and other video and instant messaging technologies 
(e.g., email, video messaging, internet) ensure current space crews such as those on the 
International Space Station (ISS) remain connected to colleagues, professional support, and 
friends and family on Earth (Khasawneh, Rogers, Bertrand, Madathil, & Gramopadhye, 
2019; Landon et al., 2016).   
Thus far, space vehicles have been designed to be primarily controlled from the 
ground making MCC the leaders of all spaceflight missions, whereby the crew acts solely 
through the leadership direction of MCC (Landon et al., 2016; Rogers, Khasawneh, 
Bertrand, & Madathil, 2017). This arrangement depends heavily on effective coordination 
across the SFMTS, especially during emergency situations. While this structure has worked 
thus far, in future LDEMs communication delays due to the distance of the spaceship as it 
travels away from Earth, will eliminate real-time communication between crew and ground 
teams (Mesmer-Magnus, Carter, Asencio, & DeChurch, 2016; Rogers, Khasawneh, 
Bertrand, & Chalil Madathil, 2019). Such communication constraints will inevitably 
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require greater spaceflight crew autonomy from MCC, however little is known about the 
changing levels of autonomy and the impact of autonomy on the team over long duration. 
In this vein, autonomy becomes a potential risk factor for the MTS. For the context of 
SFMTSs, autonomy is defined as the “conditions, constraints, and limits that influence the 
degree of discretion by the astronaut or crew over choices, actions, and support in 
accordance with standard operating procedures” (Rubino & Keeton, 2010, pg. 20). SFMTS 
autonomy increases will likely modify training needs and necessitate mission planning that 
accounts for higher involvement from the crew, in terms of procedures, structure, and even 
crew composition (Rubino & Keeton, 2010). 
To date, there have been no studies of autonomous crews in spaceflight for long 
duration missions specifically (Landon et al., 2016). However, a recent related study 
involving ISS crew members explored the impact of communication delays of roughly one 
hour with MCC on performance and well-being (Palinkas et al., 2013). In this study, 
autonomy was positively associated with crew and team performance, as well as crew well-
being. However, autonomy was not found to mediate the relationship between 
communication delays and outcomes, suggesting communication delays and autonomy 
have a unique influence on performance and health outcomes. Additionally, the Astronaut 
Journals Project (Stuster, 2010) identified outside communications with MCC as the 
second-most stated category, suggesting the importance of well-established 
communication systems in the SFMTS. For example, ISS members communicate daily 
with personnel in MCC at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas as well as with 
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payload communicators (PAYCOMs) located at the Marshall Spaceflight Center in 
Huntsville, Alabama.     
The current teaming and communication challenges experienced in SFMTSs are 
not caused directly by communication system issues, but rather by interpersonal 
frustrations between the parties communicating with each other. It is important to 
acknowledge that LDEMs will lack the ability of instant communication between ground 
and space crew, thus possibly complicating the interpersonal frustrations even more. 
Moreover, it is likely that the intricacy of future LDEMs will require increased crew 
discretion, less troublesome procedures, and general flexibility to perform tasks (Krikalev, 
Kalery, & Sorokin, 2010). These would grant the astronaut crew more autonomy from 
MCC, but with this freedom comes an increased responsibility and self-reliability for 
dealing with not only day-to-day tasks but also emergency situations that may come up. 
Thus, communication, goal, and leadership structures will probably need to shift, resulting 
in successive changes in how these MTSs and their component teams will work together 
(Zaccaro, Marks, & DeChurch, 2012).  
Given these changes, there is a need to understand how the different component 
teams must be prepared in terms of having the right attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions in 
place - at both the team and system levels - in order to be prepared for such autonomy 
shifts. We must focus on understanding the effects not only on the crew but on the system 
in order to develop appropriate countermeasures. Therefore, this research effort seeks to 
advance our understanding of autonomy shifts and boundary spanning processes in space 
in order to provide practicable countermeasures NASA can take in preparation for LDEMs.  
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The study of SFMTS in LDEMs is challenging at best due to the nature of such 
teams and the relative frequency with which such teams exist. Therefore, this study 
employs historiometry - a “collection of methods in which archival data concerning historic 
individuals and events are subjected to quantitative analyses in order to test nomothetic 
hypotheses about human thought, feeling, and action” (Simonton, 1998, p. 269). MTSs are 
particularly advantageous to explore with historiometry, as they are often well-documented 
as a source of success or failure in complex events (e.g., DeChurch, Burke, Shuffler, Lyons, 
Doty, & Salas, 2011). Specifically, this study seeks to utilize this approach to abductively 
uncover thematic patterns in prior SFMTS critical incidents that outline when and how 
autonomy shifts are likely to occur for SFMTSs and inter-team boundary spanning 
processes that are critical for responding effectively as a system when autonomy shifts 
occur.  
The Role of Multiteam Systems in Spaceflight 
For the purpose of this work, it is important to ensure clarity around MTSs in 
spaceflight. The SFMTS is comprised of multiple connections beyond the simple 
crew/ground MTS, including a network of Mission Control teams within teams, and 
extending across multiple agencies (e.g., NASA, International Space Agencies, ESA) and 
specializations (e.g., astronauts, flight controllers, engineers). For example, the 
International Space Station can be thought of as a long duration MTS, whereby mission 
controls for different international agencies (e.g., NASA, Russian Federal Space Agency) 
must work together to ensure the crew is supported during missions. In addition to 
coordinating with their crew members on the ISS, the mission control centers must also 
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coordinate with one another, and may have additional component teams that must 
coordinate as MTSs to handle issues or needs as they arise. Another example of a MTS 
operating in spaceflight could be a launch MTS, whereby different component teams are 
responsible for planning and preparing the crew and space vehicle for launch. This can 
involve engineering teams for the vehicle, psychological and health support teams for the 
crew, and a leadership team for the actual lead up to countdown and launch. 
Further, based on interviews with NASA personnel conducted by various 
researchers (e.g., Burke & Feitosa, 2015; DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2015; Shuffler, 
Jiménez-Rodríguez, & Kramer, 2015), there are four types of SFMTSs which represent the 
structural features likely to play key roles in influencing relational states within and across 
teams (depicted in Figure 1). These MTS types vary in terms of the degree to which 
differences in disciplines, shared context, uncertainty and/or culture will shape team and 
interteam relations. In this vein, one can see how space crew isolation from the SFMTS 
has several implications on team performance.   
To further understand the challenges faced by SFMTSs, it is important to mention 
that previous astronauts have noted systematic issues in regards to the ground and crew 
relations stating “I continue to be amazed by the degree to which the ground has gotten 
into the habit of taking action and not informing the crew”, “I still get frustrated by the 
degree to which we get left out of the loop. This has been a perpetual problem in the ISS 
crew world”, and “the ground too often fails to consider the crew when making decisions 
and taking action (Stuster, 2010, p. 31).” This type of divide between crewmember and 
ground will be particularly challenging for LDEMs whereby immediate and frequent 
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communication will no longer be an option. Despite the previous complaints regarding 
ground and crew relations, there is still a deep gratitude and connection between these 
component teams, and it would be irresponsible to leave out comments regarding this 
effect. Previous astronauts have noted their appreciation for MCC by stating “I am surely 
glad the ground is watching our backs. That really makes me feel better (Struster, 2010, p. 
18)”. Thus, we can see that the spaceflight MTS is a complex system that requires a multi-
faceted approach to understanding the many factors that influence it. We must 
acknowledge that the heavy dependency from crews on MCC won’t be possible during 
LDEMs, as ground will not be able to provide immediate assistance. Therefore, the 
extended communication delays will necessitate the need for positive system relations 
between crew and ground prior to space flight and the capacity to manage autonomy shifts 
without negatively impacting team performance.   
 
Figure 1. Four types of SFMTSs (Shuffler et al., 2015). 
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Autonomy Shifts & Communication Delays in LDEM SFMTSs   
Communication is one of the most vital aspects to interactions among individuals, 
teams, and MTSs. A literature review by Shuffler, Jiménez-Rodriguez, and Kramer (2015) 
on MTSs points to communication as being particularly critical to MTS effectiveness. In 
this review, communication was shown as a construct that has received significant 
empirical/theoretical attention in being an important inter-& intra-team mediator for 
functional/dysfunctional behavior processes in MTSs (see Figure 2). Further, an 
operational assessment previously conducted by Shuffler and colleagues (2015) notes 
interviewees discussed the importance of inter and intra-team communication, especially 
regarding the anticipated communication delays. Interviewees noted, “we expect there to 
be a greater number of disconnects and misunderstandings between ground and crew”. 
LDEMs will experience greater delays than ever before in communication, demanding 
increased autonomy for the astronaut crew that may have profound unprecedented effects 
on the MTS performance.   
Indeed, the anticipated autonomy shifts will have a profound effect on multiple 
aspects of the team including managing day-to-day activities, such as making decisions or 
solving various problems that may arise (Khasawneh, Ponathil, Firat Ozkan, & Chalil 
Madathil, 2018; Leach, Wall, Rogelberg, & Jackson, 2005). Increases in autonomy have 
shown to have positive effects, having an impact on multiple outcomes such as improved 
performance and satisfaction (Thompson & Prottas, 2006; Leach, et al, 2005). Thus, we 
can expect benefits in LDEM MTSs due to the anticipated autonomy shifts. For example, 
the flexibility and autonomy the astronaut crew will be given is something that has been 
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missing in current missions and a factor in causing annoyance/problems between space 
crews and ground. 
 
Figure 2. Summary of multiteam systems research framework.  
Note: Bold items represent constructs with significant empirical & theoretical attention, 
while italicized are constructs in need of future research/theory (Shuffler, et al., 2015). 
 
Stuster (2010) noted that the space crew is aware that good relations with ground 
personnel can contribute to effective task performance, but this has led to a tradition called 
“praise inflation”, in which the spaceflight crew partakes in giving out profuse 
complements, even when not deserved, and a general avoidance of criticizing the ground 
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personnel for deficiencies, real and perceived. Further, it seems that at least a portion of 
the ground personnel are more sensitive to certain remarks than the crew in space, a 
condition known to cause hypersensitivity and exaggeration of trivial issues. Thus, rather 
than facilitating the relationships between ground and on-orbit personnel, praise inflation 
and hypersensitivity are a source of annoyance to most crew and ground members.  
Further, while mission success and performance is always the first priority for 
spaceflight missions, it is just as important, especially in LDEMs, to consider how 
increases in autonomy influence intermediate outcomes, such as team cohesion (Man & 
Lam, 2003), motivation (Langfred & Moye, 2004; Spector, 1986) and inter-team trust 
(Langfred, 2005). LDEMs involve many unique stressors due to the nature of spaceflight 
(Vessey, 2014), thus increases in team autonomy in these difficult situations may 
subsequently reduce the stress of the situation. Karasek (1979, 1998) suggests that stress 
increases when demands are high, as is particularly accurate in LDEMs, and when there is 
little control or autonomy over the situation. In this vein, one method for reducing high 
levels of stress experienced in LDEMs would be to increase the autonomy of the 
component teams, particularly of the spaceflight crew itself.  
While research shows hopeful promise in the benefits autonomy can bring to 
performance, we must remember that an autonomous spaceflight crew has not been known 
to exist thus far. Therefore, autonomy shifts pose novel risks for MTSs that should be 
carefully considered. It has been established that due to the distance from Earth on LDEMs, 
communication delays between ground and crew are expected, thereby reducing the level 
of interdependence between teams in the MTS and increasing the level of autonomy teams 
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will experience. Vessey (2014) suggested that communication delays will hinder effective 
coordination between component teams, reducing the quality of teamwork between teams 
and restricting the ability of the MTS to successfully complete their mission. Further, these 
delays in communication will also limit the amount of support (e.g. informational, social) 
ground control can provide to the spaceflight crew (Kanas et al., 2007) during routine tasks 
but also novel or emergency tasks alike. This will force the spaceflight crew to adapt to the 
limited inter-team communication and the shifting inter-team autonomy. 
 With this in mind, the current research seeks to uncover thematic patterns of 
autonomous crew behavior throughout critical incidents in prior SFMTs to further our 
understanding of what situations/contexts look like that either required an autonomous shift 
in the crew (e.g., communication issues) or in which the crew simply engaged in 
autonomous behavior and what the outcomes were. Thus, this research seeks to address the 
following research questions:  
RQ 1: How is shifting inter-team autonomy exhibited within the space crew in 
SFMTSs? 
Team Boundary Work 
 It is not enough to solely uncover the context and outcomes related to inter-team 
autonomy shifts; instead it is necessary to uncover the behaviors and processes enacted 
during inter-team autonomy shifts. Recently, research has started to acknowledge team 
boundary work as an important component for SFMTS effectiveness (Pendergraft, Carter, 
Tseng, Landon, Slack, & Shuffler, 2019). Team boundary work has been defined by Faraj 
and Yan (2009) as the activities that a team engages in to establish and maintain boundaries 
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that are open enough to allow information and resources in, yet established enough to avoid 
uncertainty about who is on the team and who is held accountable for its collective 
outcomes.  
Accordingly, team boundary work can be thought of as work done by members of 
the component team that involves acquiring information and resources while also 
managing relationships with external stakeholders and protecting internal team resources 
(e.g., team members’ time and energy) from competing demands (Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2001).  To further clarify this concept, research regarding boundary spanning has identified 
three distinct types of boundary work: boundary spanning, boundary buffering, and 
boundary reinforcement (Davison & Hollenbeck, 2012; Faraj & Yan, 2009). The following 
section summarizes each type of boundary work and articulates the research questions I 
seek to answer specifically in terms of understanding boundary work in SFMTS. 
Boundary Spanning  
 Boundary spanning has been defined as a strategy of engagement, in which a focal 
team undertakes actions to reach out into its environment in order to acquire important 
resources and support. Druskat and Wheeler (2003) reported that undertaking boundary 
spanning actions strongly affects team performance. Through boundary spanning, teams 
reach out to secure necessary resources and support in order to accomplish the team goal, 
while also developing relationships with stakeholders and promoting the team’s work. 
Boundary spanning is an important activity that helps the team accomplish its objectives, 
thereby contributing to MTS performance as a whole (Davison & Hollenbeck, 2012; 
Agnisarman, Khasawneh, Ponathil, Lopes, & Madathil, 2018).  
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Boundary Buffering  
 Unlike boundary spanning, boundary buffering is a strategy of disengagement, in 
which a team closes itself off from the environment. A team buffers in order to protect 
itself from external disturbances and uncertainties, consequently enhancing the possibility 
of successful performance within (Lynn, 2005). Further, researchers have suggested that 
buffering may be undertaken either in response to or in anticipation of disruptive factors 
within the environment. It is important to note that evidence of buffering has shown to 
involve both formal strategies and procedures as well as informal codes and norms for 
deflecting these external disturbances and outside pressure or interference within the 
environment (Faraj & Yan, 2009).  Boundary buffering strengthens the team’s boundaries 
against external disturbances and protects its members by creating an internal atmosphere 
free from unnecessary disruptive factors, thereby contributing to team performance.  
Boundary Reinforcement  
 Boundary reinforcement is a less studied type of boundary work in comparison to 
buffering and spanning. This type of boundary work refers to the ways in which a team 
internally sets and reclaims its boundaries by increasing member awareness of boundaries 
and enhancing team identity. Thus, boundary reinforcement is inward-facing work that is 
focused on factors internal to the team. Through boundary reinforcement, teams can 
maintain members focused on carrying out the team’s task, possibly increasing team 
identification and commitment and enhancing individual and collective learning and 
creativity (Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001), thus contributing to team performance.   
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Boundary Work in LDEM SFMTSs 
Due to the unique nature of LDEMs, it is important to take into account 
environmental factors that may influence team boundary work. Previous research suggests 
that team boundary work may be context dependent and task specific (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1990). For instance, a team in an uncertain environment may engage in boundary buffering 
and reinforcement more heavily than it engages in spanning in order to reduce 
environmental demands impending performance (Faraj & Yan, 2009). LDEMs in space 
rely on the coordinated efforts of the SFMTS that crosses organizational, geographic, 
cultural and temporal boundaries (Anania et al., 2017).  Thus, as team boundary work can 
be influenced by the situation and context a team operates in and as boundary work 
processes can be developed and reinforced prior to and during SFMTS missions, this study 
seeks to answer the following research questions:  
RQ2: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, what team boundary work 
types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) have been utilized, and what is their impact 
on SFMTS outcomes?  
RQ3: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, how are SFMTSs boundary 
work types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) implemented?  
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METHOD 
Historiometry  
Given the challenges that LDEMs and spaceflight contexts pose in terms of 
securing adequate data collection opportunities, the present research study utilizes 
historiometric analysis (HMA) to investigate the constructs of interest using archival 
sources, in line with others who have studied these contexts (DeChurch et al., 2011). The 
HMA method has been present in the social sciences for more than a century and is 
generally defined as the systematic analysis of the content of past events through review 
and coding of previously published media documenting historical events and persons, such 
as biographies, periodicals, and written histories (Crayne & Hunter, 2018). This method is 
particularly useful for organizational sciences, because it allows researchers to convert 
historical content into numerical data that may be further analyzed statistically.  
Crayne and Hunter (2018) argue that the usefulness of HMA is further amplified 
when unique or rare data samples, context and situational specifics, and/or longitudinal 
data are examined--all of which is the case for SFMTSs. Additionally,  in a recent study 
on team leadership using HMA, Burke, Shuffler and Wiese (2018) note that historiometry 
is especially useful when exploring relatively new constructs which have not been 
thoroughly examined or understood (such as LDEMs), and also suggest that HMA benefits 
from the “contextual richness of the data and the corresponding external validity” (p. 8). 
Specifically, recent studies have relied on inductive, qualitative methods to review topics 
of group-level impacts on leadership, MTSs, team leadership, and team adaptation 
(Mumford et al., 2008; DeChurch et al., 2011; Randall, Resick, & DeChurch, 2011; Burke 
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et al., 2018). Qualitative methods that are inductive in their approach begin with data 
instead of hypotheses and involve the constant comparison of results to new data in order 
to refine ideas before an explanatory theory is developed (Brown & Glaser, 1978). Thus, 
this research utilized this approach and leveraged actual historical data from prior SFMTS 
critical incidents to successfully provide translatable, actionable results needed for 
developing the risk-mitigating interventions NASA desires.  
Critical Incident Technique 
Modeling upon similar historiometric studies of MTSs (e.g., DeChurch, et al., 
2011), the present study also employs the critical incident (CI) technique in order to ensure 
systematic extraction of relevant information from the archival data sources. The CI 
technique is defined as “a method for obtaining specific, behaviorally focused descriptions 
of work or other activities” (Bownas & Bernardin, 1988, p. 1120). SFMTS CIs are specific 
events that have occurred in prior SFMTSs and are focused on observable behaviors, 
contain descriptive information about the situational context, and conclude with outcomes 
clearly tied to behaviors described in the SFMTS incident. Following the extraction of 
critical incidents, subject-matter experts (SMEs) sort CIs into emergent set of themes and 
then confer to reach a consensus on themes identified, and finally an additional set of raters 
re-categorizes the same CIs to identify the percentage of agreement between the raters and 
evaluate viability of the thematic schemas and categories (DeChurch, et al, 2011).   
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PROCEDURE 
In a recent review, Crayne and Hunter (2018) outline the details of the HMA 
process, broken down into key steps and sub-step actions that should be taken (see 
Appendix A for steps as detailed by Crayne and Hunter (2018)). These were followed as 
summarized below.  
Historiometric Analysis  
Definition of Constructs and Research Questions  
The constructs and research questions were defined as outlined and discussed 
above. This research seeks to identify thematic patterns in crew autonomy behaviors and 
boundary spanning work in previous SFMTSs. Specifically, the constructs of focus are in 
relation to the boundary work displayed in each critical incident extracted. That is, this 
research is not simply looking at thematic behavioral patterns in which autonomy is 
displayed in the SFMTSs, but rather, it is specifically looking at the situation or context 
that initiated inter-team autonomy shifts, the type of boundary work (boundary spanning, 
boundary buffering, and/or boundary reinforcement) the team performs during a critical 
incident and the outcomes associated with such.    
Investigative Piloting  
A preliminary list of sources was created, drawing on recommendations from 
NASA subject matter experts (SMEs) as well as the resources listed on the official 
NASA.gov website. These identified sources varied in their format and intended audience 
and included government reports, mission logs from websites maintained by NASA, and 
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interviews from NASA’s oral history projects. Investigative piloting was conducted by 
evaluating sources based on the presence or absence of discrete episodes involving 
SFMTSs and using them to guide the identification of additional sources. Where episodes 
that involved descriptions of SFMTS collaboration were found, further searches were 
conducted as needed to uncover additional contextual documentation pertaining to the 
event. This stage of investigative piloting also served to inform decisions on how this 
information might be coded to determine the types of boundary work teams may engage in 
during autonomy shifts.  
Decision of Data Structure 
 A format for gathering critical incidents was chosen (see Appendix B). This format 
follows the guidelines set forth for critical incidents by Flanagan (1954) by having critical 
incidents include context, content, and consequences related to the phenomena of interest. 
However, this format was tailored to the specific needs of this study such that each critical 
incident includes the following components: spaceflight mission, relevant contextual 
information; a description of the event/trigger initiating the critical incident; a description 
of communication between ground and space crew or a description of autonomy shifts 
during the critical incident (actions taken by crew or ground); a description of the outcomes 
of the team’s actions; a summary of the critical incident; and a list of specific sources used 
to draft it.  
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Prototyping and Codebook Drafting 
 The coding of the type of boundary work and situations/contexts leading to inter-
team autonomy shifts was primarily driven by an abductive approach. A codebook was 
developed for the delineation of boundary work types. This codebook was based on the 
work done by Faraj and Yan (2009) to delineate boundary work types and examples of 
them (please see Appendix C). The boundary work types were updated as definitions were 
modified for the multi-team spaceflight context (see Appendix E). Further, a codebook for 
inter-team autonomy shift trigger types was also developed (please see Appendix D). 
Additionally, a prototype of a critical incident was developed in order to be used for 
training.  
Data Sources and Collection Refinement 
 The sources from which data was collected have been finalized to include published 
and publicly available work detailing descriptions of SFMTS.  A preliminary search for 
documents yielded a total of 108 initial sources (see Table 1). The criteria for choosing 
these sources followed recommendations by Parry, Mumford, Bower and Watts (2014).  
Table 1. Summary of resources included for SFMTS historiometric analysis  
 
Source Type Count 
Nasa Oral Histories  30 
Official NASA or government reports 11 
New articles, NASA articles, and mission archives 26 
Other NASA documents 13 
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Over 200 critical incidents were pulled from the source material. A summary table 
is provided below with the total number of incidents pulled detailing the number of critical 
incidents per mission (Table 2). Of those 254 critical incidents, 100 were selected by the 
author for use in the current historiometric analysis based on appropriate content such as 
in-flight or in-space context, as opposed to critical incidents describing incidents prior to 
or post-flight. Table 3 shows the 100 incidents by spaceflight mission used for 
historiometric analysis with their respective outcomes.   
Table 2. Count of overall critical incidents by spaceflight mission name 
 
Mission Name Grand Total 
Apollo Missions 121 
Gemini Missions 96 
Mercury-Atlas Missions 18 
Shuttle-MIR Missions 18 
Skylab Missions 1 
Total 254 
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Table 3. Count of critical incidents by spaceflight mission name used for current 
historiometric analysis  
Mission Name  
Count of CIs per Outcome  
Grand Total Successful Unsuccessful 
Apollo 10 26 2 28 
Apollo 12 9 1 10 
Apollo 16 12 1 13 
Apollo 16 1 - 1 
Apollo 17 3 - 3 
Apollo 8 6 - 6 
Apollo 9 3 - 3 
Gemini 10 6 - 6 
Gemini 11 4 - 4 
Gemini 12 4 1 5 
Gemini 5 4 2 6 
Gemini 8 4  4 
Gemini 9 - 2 2 
Mercury-Atlas 7 - 1 1 
Mercury-Atlas 9 3 - 3 
Shuttle-mir mission STS-60 1 - 1 
Shuttle-mir Mission sts-86 3 - 3 
Skylab 4 1 - 1 
Grand Total 90 10 100 
 
Coder Training   
 Coders included a total of eleven subject matter experts (SMEs), arranged into two 
sets: one set (six SMEs)  extracted critical incidents from the source material (extraction 
team) and a second set (five SMEs) was responsible for the actual coding of the extracted 
critical incidents (coding team). The extraction team consisted of six research assistants, 
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all of whom were undergraduate psychology students trained on teaming/MTS research 
and familiarized with the goals and objectives of the research.    
Critical Incident Extraction 
 The extraction team was thoroughly trained on the critical incident technique, in 
terms of the specific format developed and used for this study. This training consisted of 
learning about the critical incident technique as well as how to apply it within the context 
of this study, in terms of identifying critical incidents that describe cases of 1) autonomy 
shifts and 2) inter-team boundary work. Members of the extraction team were involved in 
practice rounds where they each assembled sets of critical incidents and received iterative 
feedback as to the quality of the incident pulled. This process continued until the lead 
research (author) was satisfied with the quality of the extracted incidents, in that all 
extracted incidents from training materials contained the needed elements in the right 
amount of detail and were being pulled in a similar manner across the individual coders.   
 Critical Incident Thematic Coding 
Following the appropriate steps in the critical incident techniques, a group of three 
SMEs individually sorted the CIs into a set of emergent themes. In order to reduce rater 
bias, the group of SMEs performing the coding of CIs was distinct from the group 
extracting the CIs. Once individual coding was completed, consensus around themes was 
determined. SMEs consulted with each other until full consensus was reached regarding 
the identified themes.   
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The training of the coding team involved a slightly different process than that of 
the extraction team. These three coders were selected as they each have relatively extensive 
experience in coding of teamwork behaviors across several similar contexts. Furthermore, 
they had a thorough understanding of teamwork, MTSs, and boundary work processes. 
This combined with the emergent nature of the coding led to the members of the coding 
team to not require formal training. Instead, they were guided by their prior knowledge in 
the area, as well as the use of the codebook created discussed above (see Appendix C, D & 
E).  
Retranslation of Critical Incidents into Thematic Coding Categories 
Finally, a different group of two SMEs individually sorted the same CIs. The 
purpose of this final group of raters was to retranslate the CIs in order to identify inter-rater 
reliability and evaluate the viability of themes identified. SMEs consulted with each other 
until full consensus was reached regarding the identified themes.  
Protocol Execution and Managing Coder Fatigue  
Execution began with the pulling of critical incidents from the source material by 
the trained coders. Each critical incident was built from the chosen material by 
paraphrasing and creating summaries of the events and behaviors displayed by the 
spaceflight team. After each critical incident was pulled from the source material, it went 
through a quality control review by the author to ensure all relevant information was pulled 
from the original source material.  As previously mentioned, 100 critical incidents were 
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chosen to go through the coding exercise. These incidents were chosen by the author as 
appropriate critical incidents for coding team boundary work within SFMTSs.  
The critical incidents were then used by coders to identify the boundary work type 
as either team boundary spanning work, team boundary buffering work, or team boundary 
reinforcement work and to specify the situation/context of each CI, implementation 
processes of boundary work, and outcome associated with each CI. First round and second 
round (back-translation) coders went through critical incidents by mission. That is, coders 
coded all critical incidents for a single spaceflight mission at a time. This served to ensure 
that coders had the maximum available context when coding each critical incident, as well 
as minimized cognitive load and coder fatigue. At the conclusion of coding, the coding 
team met for consensus meetings to resolve any discrepancies in coding.  
Data Analysis Approach 
To examine Research Question 1, the coding of how shifting inter-team autonomy 
was exhibited for each CI was examined to determine the factors that lead to shifting inter-
team autonomy in SFMTSs. To analyze this data, three main factors that we believed were 
three main possible ways for shifting inter-team autonomy to be exhibited were created as 
coding options. These three factors were Crew Claiming, MCC Granting, and 
Environmental Factors – please see Appendix C for definitions.  After being coded the 
themes were ranked to provide further insights into factors which most commonly lead to 
inter-team autonomy shifts. The same process was executed to examine Research 
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Questions 2 and 3 focusing on the specific objective of each research question. Research 
Question 2 examined the type(s) of team boundary work exhibited in the presence of inter-
team autonomy shifts with their respective outcomes, and Research Question 3 took a more 
in depth-look at how these team boundary work types were put in place to identify if there 
was a specific order to them.  These were the recommended and most appropriate analyses 
for this type of work, as similar processes have previously been implemented in similar 
studies (e.g., DeChurch et al., 2011; Pendergraft et al., 2019).   
To conduct these analyses, this study utilized the definitions of team boundary work 
types provided by Faraj and Yan (2009) as a basis, but modifications to the definitions 
were made due to the unique environment SFMTSs are in. For example, team boundary 
buffering for this study was defined as the disengagement of one team from the MTS or its 
environment, similarly to how Farj and Yan (2009) defined it. However, we went one step 
further to specifically identify team boundary buffering as any critical incident that 
involved the space crew deliberately not reaching out to MCC. The difference here is that 
in a more common environment, a team not reaching out to another for help may not 
necessarily indicate buffering. However, because protocol suggests the space crew reach 
out to MCC when any issues arise, not reaching out to MCC during an incident was 
considered buffering boundary work. Further modifications and additions were made to 
the team boundary work types (please see appendix D and E).  
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RESULTS 
Inter-team Autonomy Shifts 
RQ1: How is shifting inter-team autonomy exhibited within the space crew in SFMTSs? 
 The results of the analyses depicted within the methods section yielded several 
interesting findings. One of the primary questions of interest was focused on identifying 
the way in which inter-team autonomy shifts took place by the space crew within SFMTSs. 
In this vein, we focused on three primary ways in which autonomy may be triggered: Crew 
Claiming, MCC Granting and Environmental Factors.  
 Results of the thematic analysis indicated all three triggers played a factor in the 
way inter-team autonomy shifts were seen within the SFMTSs, specifically focused on an 
autonomous space crew. More than half (65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded 
demonstrated an inter-team autonomy shift (see Table 4). Not surprisingly, since most 
space vehicles have been designed to be primarily controlled from the ground making MCC 
the leaders of all spaceflight missions (Landon et al., 2016) our results showed that MCC 
Granting was the lowest autonomy shift trigger. Crew Claiming was the highest trigger for 
inter-team autonomy shifts showing an autonomous space crew within the SFMTS.   
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Table 4. Percentage (%) type of trigger by observed inter-team autonomy shift in space 
crew 
Type of Team 
Autonomy Shift 
Trigger (%) 
Inter-Team Autonomy Shift? (%) Grand Total (%) 
No Yes 
Crew Claiming  - 46 46 
MCC Granting 1 21 22 
Environmental Factors  5 5 
No Shift  27 - 27 
Grand Total (%) 28 72 100  
 
Team Boundary Work Patterns  
RQ2: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, what team boundary work types 
have been utilized, and what is their impact on SFMTS outcomes?  
 A second area of interest pertained to the type of team boundary work exhibited 
within the SFMTS when an autonomy shift takes place, and the respective outcomes.  
Findings show that multiple types of team boundary work were often exhibited per critical 
incident. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, coders were not limited to choosing 
solely one type of team boundary work, thus the results show different emerging types of 
team boundary work exhibited during inter-team autonomy shifts. It is important to note 
that during the analysis, critical incidents were coded for boundary-work type even if they 
did not exhibit an autonomy-shift in order to better understand team boundary work in 
SFMTSs (table 5). However, the focus of RQ2 was on identifying themes or patterns in 
team boundary work type when an inter-team autonomy shift was exhibited. Buffering and 
Reinforcement were identified as the top team boundary work types, followed closely by 
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Reinforcement & Spanning. The results show that very rarely is only one type of team-
boundary work shown when there is an inter-team autonomy shift (see table 6).  
Table 5. Count of team boundary work types by witnessed autonomy in space crews 
Boundary-work Type 
Inter-Team Autonomy Shift?   
No Yes Grand Total 
All 3 - 13 13 
Buffering - 2 2 
Buffering 
Reinforcement - 24 24 
Reinforcement 2 3 5 
Reinforcement, Spanning 2 22 24 
Spanning 31 - 31 
Spanning, Buffering, - 1 1 
Grand Total 35 65 100 
 
Table 6. Top three team boundary work types for inter-team autonomy shifts within 
SFMTSs.  
Team boundary work 
type(s)  
Rank 
order 
% of critical 
incidents supporting 
rank (%) 
Buffering & 
Reinforcement 
1 37 
Reinforcement & 
Spanning 
2 34 
Buffering, Reinforcement 
& Spanning 
3 20 
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Table 7. Ranked team boundary work type for CI exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts 
per outcome  
Boundary Work Type Outcome of CI with Inter-team 
autonomy shift 
Total (%) 
Successful (%) Unsuccessful (%) 
Buffering & Reinforcement 33.33 - 33.33 
Reinforcement & Spanning 29.17 1.39 30.56 
All 3 - Buffering, Reinforcement & 
Spanning 
13.89 4.17 18.06 
Spanning 8.33 1.39 9.72 
Reinforcement 2.78 1.39 4.17 
Buffering 2.78 - 2.78 
Spanning & Buffering - 1.39 1.39 
Total % of inter-team autonomy 
shifts (%) 
90.28 9.72 100 
 
 In addition, when looking at the outcomes of the coded critical incidents the results 
showed that most incidents which exhibited inter-team autonomy shifts ended in a 
successful outcome, with buffering and reinforcement together being the highest team-
boundary work types to end in successful outcomes (see table 7). This finding is addressed 
further in the discussion portion.   
Team Boundary Work Processes  
RQ3: When faced with shifting inter-team autonomy, how are SFMTSs boundary work 
types (e.g., spanning, buffering, reinforcement) implemented?  
 Further, investigating the structural process of team boundary work when inter-
team autonomy shifts were exhibited was the focus of Research Question 3. The analysis 
showed that when buffering and reinforcement took place within a single incident, they all 
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started with buffering followed by reinforcement making up 33% of critical incidents 
exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts. All the critical incidents that exhibited buffering 
and reinforcement within one incident were successful, leading us to see these boundary 
work types together as the most effective in terms of success. Furthermore, reinforcement 
and spanning were the second highest boundary work types exhibited within a single 
critical incident making up almost 31% of the inter-team autonomy shift critical incidents. 
There were four different ways these boundary work types were implemented regarding 
the boundary-work process, that is we identified four different ways of the order in which 
reinforcement and spanning were exhibited. Table 8 shows these findings in more detail. 
Lastly, the third highest types of boundary work exhibited within one critical incident was 
made up of all three types of team boundary work: buffering, reinforcement and spanning. 
Cis that exhibited all three types of team boundary work made up 18% of the critical 
incidents exhibiting inter-team autonomy shifts. It was in these scenarios where we saw 
the highest number of unsuccessful CIs making up 4% of the critical incidents coded for 
inter-team autonomy shifts. This finding is interesting as it begins to point out that perhaps 
when all three team boundary work types are exhibited there is too much chaos or 
disturbance, leading to unsuccessful management of issues by the multiteam system.  
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Table 8. Top 3 boundary work types with boundary work processes and outcomes 
Team boundary 
work type(s) for 
coded inter-
team autonomy 
shift(s) CIs 
Boundary Work Process  
Outcome  
Total  
(%)  
Successful 
(%) 
Unsuccessful 
(%) 
Buffering & 
Reinforcement Buffering --> Reinforcement 33.33 - 33.33 
Total (%) 33.33  33.33 
Reinforcement & 
Spanning 
Reinforcement --> Spanning 9.72 1.39 11.11 
Reinforcement --> Spanning --> 
Reinforcement 2.78 - 2.78 
Spanning --> Reinforcement 15.28 - 15.28 
Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Spanning 1.39  1.39 
Total (%) 29.17 1.39 30.56 
Buffering, 
Reinforcement & 
Spanning  
Buffering --> Reinforcement --> Spanning 8.33 1.39 9.72 
Buffering --> Reinforcement --> Spanning --> 
Reinforcement 1.39 - 1.39 
Spanning --> Buffering --> Reinforcement 1.39 2.78 4.17 
Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Buffering 1.39 - 1.39 
Spanning --> Reinforcement --> Buffering --> 
Spanning 1.39 - 1.39 
Total (%) 13.89 4.17 18.06 
 
Additional Themes  
 Through the coding exercise additional themes surfaced that should be mentioned. 
Although this study found that autonomy shifts have been exhibited frequently in past 
missions, making up 65% of our coded incidents, the relinquishing of autonomy by the 
space crew was an additional theme that came up during the coding exercise. These 
incidents involved the space crew having autonomy and then for one reason or another 
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relinquishing the autonomy back to MCC. In some instances, the space crew was seen 
claiming its own autonomy and attempting to manage the issues by themselves but once 
they realized they would not be able to resolve the issue on their own they relinquished 
autonomy and asked for help or guidance from MCC. Other times environmental factors 
led to the space crew gaining autonomy, in these instances the space crew would either try 
to manage the issue on their own or not try at all from the start, but in the end would always 
wait until they could come back in contact with MCC to ask for help. We can see there is 
an eagerness and confidence exhibited by the space crew in wanting autonomy from MCC, 
but the relinquishing of autonomy leads us to believe that there are still more steps that 
need to be taken to prepare the space crew to be successful when autonomous. Lastly, the 
theme of the space crew relinquishing autonomy was only seen when the space crew 
claimed its autonomy or received autonomy by environmental factors, it was not seen when 
MCC granted autonomy to the space crew. Table 9 and 10 detail these themes.  
Table 9. Additional themes identified in autonomy shifts triggered by crew claiming 
Additional Themes 
CIs with Autonomy Shifts Total 
(%) 
Space crew relinquishing autonomy 24 
Weak reinforcement 12 
Grand Total (%) 36 
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Table 10. Percentage of relinquishing autonomy critical incidents with outcomes 
Autonomy Shift 
Trigger Type 
Relinquishing Autonomy CIs with 
Autonomy Shifts 
(%) Successful (%) Unsuccessful (%) 
Crew Claiming 6 2 8 
Environmental Focus 14 2 16 
Grand Total (%) 20 4 24 
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DISCUSSION 
Overall, designing valid interventions for SFMTSs is inevitably challenging: our 
knowledge of how SFMTSs optimally function is limited, and access to those familiar with 
these environments is equally difficult. However, historiometric approaches enable us to 
translate from our past, in order to be proactive and reactive for future SFMTS success. 
This study seeks to continue to comprehensively and inductively identify specific SFMTS 
contexts involving inter-team autonomy shifts and boundary work processes, focusing on 
functional and dysfunctional outcomes.   
Regarding trigger types for inter-team autonomy shifts, we saw that the majority 
(65%) of the 100 critical incidents coded exhibited this shift. This is a good sign for future 
missions that expect to have a greater number of autonomy shifts, as through our analysis 
we can confirm that SFMTSs have already been dealing with them. Further, digging deeper 
into this finding, we see that many of these autonomy shifts were triggered by the space 
crew claiming its autonomy from Mission Control. Almost half (46%) of the critical 
incidents exhibited an inter-team autonomy shift triggered by “crew claiming”. This is a 
key takeaway as it suggests and further confirms the eagerness and confidence from space 
crews within their team unit to take charge and be less reliant on MCC. This may also be a 
good sign for future missions expecting a more autonomous space crew.  
While “crew claiming” was a popular inter-team autonomy shift trigger, a pattern 
witnessed within crew claiming emerged in the form of the relinquishing of autonomy by 
the space crew. That is, shortly after the space crew claimed its autonomy, they 
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relinquished it back to MCC. As we see that space crews desire to be more autonomous 
from MCC, the next steps may be to ensure that they have the appropriate tools and training 
in order to be successful when autonomous. In other words, how can we diminish this 
theme of “relinquishing autonomy”? More research around this specific theme is needed, 
but countermeasures can begin to be developed to mitigate this from happening on LDEMs.   
Moreover, this study served in an exploratory manner to begin to identify themes 
and patterns in team boundary work during autonomy shifts in SFMTSs. Lastly, two 
additional themes (shown in Table 9) emerged from this study that were coded as the 
relinquishing of autonomy by the space crew and the observation of a different type of 
reinforcement which the coders identified as weak reinforcement. While this study shows 
us interesting findings, there remains a great amount of work to be done to truly solidify 
our understanding on team boundary work in SFMTSs.   
Although future research is needed to further validate the current team boundary 
work patterns and inter-team autonomy shift trigger types, the overall themes and content 
created from this study have several practical implications for NASA.  The team boundary 
work patterns found indicate the types of functional boundary work for inter-team 
autonomy shifts in complex spaceflight multiteam systems that occur most often and the 
outcomes historically tied to them. From these patterns of descriptive behaviors 
countermeasures and training can begin to be developed.  
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Similarly, these patterns could be used to develop team performance and feedback 
tools that reflect these important foci of functional team boundary work throughout inter-
team autonomy shifts in SFMTSs. As spaceflight multiteam contexts are complex, 
informationally rich, and time-limited, the development of automated feedback tools will 
gather and feed information back to teams regarding such team boundary work behaviors 
as information flow within, between, and across teams in the system would be a particularly 
valuable practical application.  
Limitations 
While this study contributes to theory on team boundary work, several limitations 
need to be considered. First, the emphasis on context-rich cases, and inductive theory-
generative approach makes our findings highly specific to the context in which we are 
interested (i.e., spaceflight multiteam systems), which comes at the expense of the inability 
to fully generalize the findings to other multiteam systems. Thus, the types of teams studied 
form boundary conditions for the results. It could be expected that the results presented 
herein apply to extreme teams as defined by Bell, Brown, Colaneri, and Outland (2018): 
those who (a) complete their tasks in performance environments with one or more 
contextual features that are atypical in level (e.g., extreme time pressure) or kind (e.g., 
confinement, danger) and (b) for which ineffective performance has serious consequences. 
That is, the findings may hold for astronauts, military personnel, wildland firefighters, or 
other teams with high skill levels who operate in intense, dynamic contexts under the 
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pressure of extreme consequences, often life or death. However, they may be most 
applicable to extreme teams who are predominantly intact in their membership and where 
members have a high level of task-based experience.  
 Another limitation of this study is that its sample of critical incidents considered 
happened to be made up of overwhelmingly successful outcomes.  Thus, as mentioned in 
the results, our findings showed that most team boundary work witnessed when inter-team 
autonomy shifts were triggered led to successful outcomes, but this may simply be due to 
the number of critical incidents with successful outcomes in our sample. That is, many of 
the documents used to develop incidents were focused upon near disasters and ways to 
improve these systems. It could be possible that different processes may exist for incidents 
with less successful outcomes. 
Furthermore, the way in which a critical incident is structured can oftentimes affect 
the way that it is coded. Specifically, when coding incidents, the length of critical incidents 
is an interesting point to keep in mind. There were times when one critical incident could 
have been broken into two unique critical incidents, thus possibly changing the outcome 
that was coded as successful. This is an interesting matter to keep in mind for future similar 
studies and may be a way to mitigate the issue of having an overly large sample size of 
successful or unsuccessful critical incidents.  
Lastly, while the proposed study intended to study inter-team autonomy shifts, the 
findings suggest that what took place may best be referred to as changes in autonomy. It is 
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important to point this out because inter-team autonomy shifts seem to refer more directly 
to moments where autonomy is continuously changing. This was not the case in most of 
our critical incidents. What was witnessed was moments when the crew became 
autonomous or dependent on MCC. At most we saw shifts in the relinquishing of autonomy 
by the space crew, but this was not a back and forth of autonomy levels. Thus, perhaps it 
is needed to fully understand what we mean when we refer to inter-team autonomy shifts, 
as thus far it is loosely defined. More work is needed in this area.  
Implications and Future Directions 
The aim of this study was to inductively generate aspects of team boundary work 
and inter-team autonomy shift triggers important to spaceflight multiteam systems for long 
duration exploration missions. While there is clearly some correspondence between the 
theories used as basis points for this study and its findings, there are also unique notable 
differences which represent fruitful targets for future empirical studies of team boundary 
work within such contexts. Future research is needed that further explores these patterns 
and autonomy shift triggers in SFMTSs.  
Although the team boundary work patterns, and autonomy shift triggers provide an 
interesting starting point for empirical work of team boundary work in MTSs, these 
patterns and triggers need to be examined in terms of their effect on system level outcomes. 
In other words, we need to further understand whether the identified patterns have a causal 
outcome on the multiteam system or act as mediators.  
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Further, the themes identified were derived using the critical incident method and 
are descriptive of behaviors that could be used as the basis of team and boundary spanner 
training for LDEMs. As NASA prepares for LDEMs, boundary spanner roles – those who 
connect or span the boundaries between distinct teams and support the development of 
team cognition – have been a topic of interest for SFMTSs (Anania et al., 2017). That is, 
understanding the type of boundary work and processes can help to further identify 
appropriate trainings for these roles. Additionally, this work aimed to identify autonomy-
shift trigger types focused on the space crew. It would be interesting to instead identify 
specific individual roles that triggered these autonomy shifts and include those findings 
into boundary spanner leadership training.  
Conclusion 
As focus on the importance of team and multi-team systems research continues, the 
importance of team boundary work and inter-team autonomy shifts continues as well. This 
study serves to begin to break apart the specifics of how shifting inter-team autonomy is 
exhibited within teams (i.e., crew claiming, mission control granting) in space and what 
team boundary work (i.e., buffering) looks like in SFMTSs. Though this study works 
within a specific type of team (i.e. spaceflight teams) in a specific context (i.e. space), it 
may well have implications for other types of extreme teams. Furthermore, this study may 
serve as a springboard for further research to continue to investigate the specifics of these 
processes as well as continue to examine them through other, varied methods.  
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Appendix A 
Crayne and Hunter’s (2018) Steps and Substeps for Historiometric Analysis 
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Appendix B 
Coded Critical Incident Example 
Mission Gemini 9 
CI # G9-4 
 
 
CI 
Narrative/ 
Summary 
The astronaut conducting the EVA (Cernan) on the third day of the Mission 
realized it would be unsafe for him to continue with his tasks. His heart rate was 
increasing, he was sweating to the point that his visor was fogged up, and the 
stiffness of his spacesuit limited his mobility. After contacting Mission Control, he 
was told to take a break. However, he wanted to continue the EVA and began to 
connect himself to the Applied Meteorology Unit. Another astronaut (Stafford) 
ordered him to return to the shuttle. Stafford had to physically help Cernan back 
into the spacecraft since Cernan was in physical pain from the space suit 
pressure. Cernan attempted to remove a mirror from the side of the spacecraft, 
which resulted in his visor becoming completely fogged up. He and Stafford 
were able to re-pressurize the cabin, but the EVA was discontinued for the time 
being. After this incident, the AMU was never used again on Gemini.  
Outcome Unsuccessful 
Autonomy 
Shift 
Trigger 
Type 
Crew Claiming 
Boundary 
Work 
Type(s) 
Buffering, Spanning & Reinforcement 
Order of 
Boundary 
Work 
Spanning  Buffering  Reinforcement 
Source(s) Cernan, Eugene; Davis, & Donald A. (2013). "13" (Kindle)| The Last Man on the 
Moon: Astronaut Eugene Cernan and America's Race in Space (Unabridged. 
ed.). New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 9781429971782 
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Appendix C 
Codebook: Interteam Autonomy Shift Trigger Types 
Inter-Team Autonomy Shift 
Trigger Type 
Definition 
 
Crew Claiming 
 
Space crew claims autonomy from MCC. Generally, the 
behaviors witnessed will show a clear action where the space 
crew is working alone within their own component team.  
 
 
MCC Granting 
 
Autonomy is given to the space crew by MCC either by clear 
direction from MCC to the space crew with orders to handle 
the incident by themselves or through recommendations on 
actions to take, leaving the space crew to make the final 
decision.  
 
 
Environmental Factors 
 
Environmental factors outside of any component team’s 
control (e.g., communication issues, orbital distances) cause 
the autonomy shift.  
 
 
No Shift 
 
No autonomy shift is witnessed during the critical incident. 
Typically, will involve heavy spanning or sole reinforcement 
boundary work.  
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Appendix D 
Codebook: Faraj and Yan (2009) Team Boundary Work Definitions 
Team 
Boundary 
Work  
 
 
Definitions by Faraj & Yan (2009) 
Spanning 
 
Strategy of engagement, in which a focal team undertakes actions to reach 
out into its environment in order to acquire important resources and support. 
 
Buffering 
 
Strategy of disengagement, in which a team closes itself off from the 
environment. Protects itself from external disturbances and uncertainties. 
 
Reinforcement 
 
A team internally sets and reclaims its boundaries by increasing member 
awareness of boundaries and enhancing team identity. 
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Appendix E 
Codebook: Team Boundary Work Expanded Definitions 
Team 
Boundary 
Work 
 
Definition by Faraj & Yan (2009) 
 
Expanded Definition 
Sp
an
ni
ng
 Strategy of engagement, in which a 
focal team undertakes actions to reach 
out into its environment in order to 
acquire important resources and 
support. 
 
Space crew reaches out to MC (or 
environment) for help, and/ or is 
open enough to receive 
information/help from MC. 
Bu
ffe
rin
g Strategy of disengagement, in which a team closes itself off from the 
environment. Protects itself from 
external disturbances and uncertainties. 
 
Space crew chooses NOT to go to 
MC for help/guidance/information. 
NOT engaging in the first place. 
Re
in
fo
rc
em
en
t 
A team internally sets and reclaims its 
boundaries by increasing member 
awareness of boundaries and 
enhancing team identity. 
Space crew works together to come 
up with an idea or solution by 
themselves, relying on internal 
team members and their knowledge 
to come up with a solution. 
Additionally, performing their 
expected duties without 
engagement from MC. 
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Appendix F 
Inter-team Autonomy Shift Trigger Type Examples 
Autonomy Shift 
Trigger Type 
 
Critical Incident Coded Example 
 
 
 
 
Crew Claiming 
 
The Skylab 4 astronauts were unhappy with the way the ground 
control team micromanaged their work schedules. The crew 
complained repeatedly that they were overworked and never allowed 
to make their own decisions on when to do tasks. Halfway through 
their 84-day mission, the crew told Houston not to bother calling; they 
were taking the day off and would not answer the radio. The next day, 
after serious discussions, Houston agreed to modify their approach. 
Rather than detailed timelines with each minute scheduled, 
crewmembers would receive a daily list of tasks to be accomplished, 
which they could personally organize in the most effective sequence. 
 
 
 
 
MCC Granting 
 
After five long days of being on the space shuttle mission control let 
the space crew decide if they wanted to sleep in after completing the 
first part of their mission. Before deciding what to do the space crew 
reviewed a list of tasks, they had to do the following day to make sure 
sleeping in was the appropriate option. After talking about it with all the 
crew members they decided to let mission control know that they 
would be sleeping in the next day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Factors 
 
During Apollo 16, the lunar module (LM) and command module (CM) 
were separated with two and one astronauts in each, respectively. 
Suddenly, the CM begins shaking with a gimbal oscillating out of 
control. None of the astronauts can contact Mission Control (MC) as 
their orbit location prevents contact. The CM astronaut asks the LM 
astronauts for suggestions, but they have none, and revert to the flight 
rules. Unable to gain proper operation of the CM, the astronauts 
decide to rendezvous the LM and CM. The astronauts aboard the two 
separate ships begin communicating their location, and start 
referencing stars to help guide each other until they can rendezvous 
and finally gain control of the CM.  
 
 
 
 
 
No Shift  
 
As the space crew was completing the five tests that needed to be 
done before re-entry the crew noticed they didn't know how to fully 
complete the final test. The space crew asked mission control on how 
to navigate the final test that needed to be done before re-entry. 
Mission control informed them that they would need to go 
counterclockwise on their switch back around when completing final 
test. Then when finished with that they would need to go onto the next 
non exit skip pattern. The space crew followed the instructions from 
mission control and the outcome of this critical incident was a success.  
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Appendix G 
Team Boundary Work Expanded Definitions Example 
Team Boundary 
Work 
Critical Incident Coded Example 
 
Sp
an
ni
ng
 
The space crew had just completed tracking landmarks when mission 
control contacted them about the fuel cells for the flight back home. 
Mission control (MC) had constructed a new fuel cell plan where they were 
going to leave it offline in an open circuit. They wanted the space crew to 
turn the fuel cell in-line heaters off and monitor the temperature. MC told 
the space crew they had to make sure the temperature stayed between 
390 and 410. This would allow them to go as long as 50 hours without 
purging. MC acted created this solution for the space crew to use the fuel 
more wisely to get back home, which resulted in a positive outcome.  
 
Bu
ffe
rin
g 
The space crew members identified that they were having a serious 
problem with waste escaping the waste compartment. First, they thought 
that the waste compartment was full, and this was causing the waste to 
overflow, however they realized this was not the issue, rather that the 
suction was not working properly and waste was simply floating to the top 
and flowing out. The crew decided they would have to stick their hand 
deep into the waste compartment to ensure that they’re waste would not 
come up. A crew member was either chosen as the unlucky individual to 
have to do this or an individual volunteered, it is unclear how the individual 
was chosen. However, the space crew did not attempt to reach mission 
control for help with this issue. Pushing the waste deep into the waste 
compartment fixed the issue. 
 
Re
in
fo
rc
em
en
t 
As the space crew was traveling, they realized something was wrong with 
the heater. According to procedures, the space crew should communicate 
this to mission control but were unable to because their location in space 
did not permit them to communicate with mission control. One of the space 
crew members asked why they didn’t tell mission control earlier when they 
were in contact with them, but other members mentioned that the heater 
light had not come on until after they had lost communication with mission 
control. The space crew began to attempt to fix the heater themselves. 
They thought it was an exhaust temperature issue but also thought it could 
be the pump package. They went through all the circuit breaker buttons 
but could not fix the heater. The space crew decided to wait until they got 
back in contact with mission control to fix the heater with their help. It is 
unclear from the transcripts if the space crew were able to fix the heater in 
the end with mission control's help, but they were unable to fix it 
themselves. 
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